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In
late May 1942, somber-looking Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell told a
group of reporters that his allied force “got a hell of a beating.”
Stilwell, a career Army officer and veteran of World War I, had just been
handed a sound defeat by Japanese forces operating in Burma. The American
general had only been in command for less than two months when his
combined force of Chinese, British and Indian soldiers were routed out of
Burma. This not only bruised the allies’ ego but more importantly the
Japanese closed and destroyed the Burma Road—the only overland supply
route stretching from northern India through Burma and into China. If the
allies wanted to drive the Japanese out of China, Stilwell resolved that
the vital route must be reopened.
With
the route open, allied forces could supply the ill-equipped Chinese, who
it was hoped could then tie down the large and hard fought Japanese 18th
Division. U.S. and British forces could then use Burmese airfields as bases for
future operations against Japan's home islands. Before a large scale
ground assault into Burma could happen, it was first essential to send
limited supplies to Chinese guerrilla forces already fighting the Japanese
in Burma. This task fell to the U.S. Tenth Air Force. Operating in
northern India the Tenth was responsible for flying “The Hump,” a
dangerous passage over the crest of the Himalayan mountains. Despite
contending with poor weather, 15,000 foot mountain peeks and a swarm of
Japanese fighter planes operating from a base at Myitkyina, Burma, the U.S.
airmen performed admirably. By August 1943 plans to invade Burma were in
full swing.
It
was the Americans, more than any other allies, that wanted the Japanese
out of Burma. However, there were no U.S. ground combat troops in the
theater. Both the Chinese, under the leadership of Chiang Kia-shek (who
Stilwell refereed to as a “peanut”), and the British refused to commit
large numbers of their soldiers to action in Burma. Upset, Stilwell
requested American forces be sent to India. A call to perform “a
dangerous and hazardous mission” was soon issued for volunteers from
existing Pacific Theater and stateside Army units. What Stilwell got were
not well trained fighters as he had hoped. He received a conglomeration
of, according to one Army historian, “adventurers, small-town Midwestern
farm boys, a few Native Americans and Japanese Americans and a great
number of disciplinary cases that commanders were only too happy to
unload.”
These
3,000 “misfits” as one Army officer put it were sent to India, trained
in jungle warfare and designated the 5307 Composite Unit, code named
GALAHAD. Stilwell’s long-time friend Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill
was placed in command and the unit was ready for action by early 1944.
Plans were drawn up for an offensive to begin with a Chinese-American
force attacking North Burma with the goal of capturing Myitkyina which
would remove the threat of enemy fighter planes attacking allied forces
flying the Hump. Stilwell also planed to use Myitkyina as a bomber base
for attacks on the Japanese homeland.
On
February 24, preceded by two Chinese divisions, GALAHAD, now split into
three battalions, began its way through the jungle-choked terrain of
Northeast Burma. Now termed Merrill’s Marauders, in honor of its
commander, GALAHAD quickly struck Japanese outposts all along the Burma
front and by March 3 all battalions had reached the main Japanese line of
retreat. Hoping to cut off elements of the Japanese 18th
Division, the Marauders moved around the enemy then established
roadblocks, dug in and waited. The following day the Japanese attacked but
after four days of harsh fighting the enemy sought another route of
retreat. GALAHAD was relieved by a Chinese regiment but Stilwell had other
plans for the Americans.
The
general wanted to continue the press toward Myitkyina before the
mid-summer monsoon rains forced an end to the campaign. To this date,
Merrill’s Marauders were the only unit in Burma that made steady
progress towards the objective. Additionally, expected British
reinforcements were now bottled up in Imphal, India, trying to stave off a
large Japanese assault. As a result, Stilwell called on GALAHAD to split into two
parts and envelop the 18th Division’s right flank and then
cut the Japanese line of communication. The Marauders, after marching
through some of the toughest terrain of the campaign and fighting several
pitched battles, successfully completed their task by late April.
GALAHAD
was reduced from its original 3,000 men to less than 1,400 and most of
these soldiers were sick, ill-equipped and tired. The men were now looking
forward to promised relief
and a long rest behind the lines. Stilwell had other ideas. Assured by the
British that the situation in Imphal was under control, Stilwell wanted to
launch a final assault to
capture Myitkyina, the Marauders would spearhead the operation. GALAHAD
was issued new clothing, equipment and received the first mail in months
but as one Marauder noted, “a grotesque rumor began to be heard, passed
along in deprecating tones, pretty much as a joke.” The Marauders were
going back into action.
On
May 17, after a 65-mile grueling march over the 6,000-foot Kumon Mountain
range to Myitkyina, the Marauders, along with several Chinese regiments,
attacked the unsuspecting Japanese at the Myitkyina airfield. The
defenders were quickly overwhelmed and the victorious allies rejoiced
while pressing toward the town of Myitkyina. Lacking accurate intelligence
about the size of the Japanese garrison in Myitkyina a Chinese regiment
ran into the town. They were quickly engulfed by the superior and better
armed Japanese force. Witnessing the slaughter, the Marauders knew they
could not easily take the town and fell back to the airfield.
Despite
losing a Chinese regiment, when word arrived at Stilwell’s headquarters
of the capture of the airfield, he was jubilant. He soon sent word to
Merrill that he would fly in Chinese reinforcements and relieve the
Marauders. However, jubilation turned to gloom as the Japanese held out
and allied forces were forced to lay siege to Myitkyina. By this time the
British had soundly defeated the Japanese at Imphal and Stilwell requested
help to lift the Myitkyina siege. To his dismay he was told that it would
be at least two months before any British divisions could be transferred
to Burma. The Marauders were ordered to stay.
Ill-suited
for siege warfare, the light infantrymen of GALAHAD nearly became mutinous
over their new orders. Still, the Marauders seeing no other alternative
held their line. Conditions became so bad that many sick Marauders cut
holes in the seats of their pants so their dysentery would not interrupt
the firing of weapons. By May 25 GALAHAD was losing more than seventy-five
men daily to malaria, dysentery and scrub typhus. Despite this, the unit
fought bravely and on June 17 near the Irrawaddy River north of Myitkyina
successfully cut the Japanese supply line into the city. Two weeks later
the besieged city fell to a Chinese attack. The war for GALAHAD was
over, Stilwell finally lived up to his promise and relieved the
disease-ridden and malnourished Marauders who were almost all evacuated to
hospitals.
In
August 1944 what was left of GALAHAD was consolidated with the 475th
Infantry. These men, along with members of the Texas National Guard,
formed the Mars Task Force and continued operations deep into the Burmese
jungle. A strong offensive began in early October which cumulated with
members of the Mars Task Force reaching the Burma Road later that month.
In January 1945, U.S. Army engineers opened the passage. With the road
finally open allied forces quickly routed the Japanese out of Burma and
were able to funnel supplies into mainland China. However, much to the
dismay of the United States and Britain, Chinese leader Chiang Kia-shek
became wrapped up in internal strife between his forces and Communist
rivals and did little to help the allies finish the job against Japan. In
the end, the opening of the Burma Road according to one Army historian
“had little effect on the outcome of the war and even less on its
aftermath.”
For
the 3,000 “misfits” that arrived in India in 1942 the China-Burma
campaign did accomplish something: it showed the world what hardened
American soldiers could do. Looking back on the unit’s experiences
Marauder Robert Passanisi commented, “During their campaigns they were
apparently forgotten, frequently lost, occasionally mutinous and almost
always magnificent!” For their accomplishments and hardships in Burma the
Marauders were awarded the Army’s coveted Distinguished Unit Citation in
July 1944.
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To command the 5307 composite unit, Lieutenant
General Joseph W. Stilwell (left) chose his long-time friend, Major
General Frank Merrill (right). The 5307 was nicknamed "Merrill's
Marauders" in honor of the popular general.
Flying the Hump, Moonlight, CBI by Tom Lea. Pilots flying this treacherous route kept Allied
supply lines open. (Army Art Collection)
North Burma Operations
General Merrill (center) explains battle plans to two subordinates during
operations in early April 1944.
While campaigning, radio units provided the Marauders with their only
contact with the outside world.
A Marauder mourns a fallen friend.
While in North Burma, GALAHAD used local guerrilla soldiers, such as this
young boy, called Kachins for guides and snipers.
Advance to Myitkyina
While marching to Myitkyina the Marauders used pack mules to haul their
heavy equipment. Everything else was carried in knapsacks on their backs.
Using only these small howitzers
the Marauders helped lay siege to Myitkyina from May through June 1944.
With
help from the Mars Task Force and U.S. Army engineers, the Burma road was
reopened in early 1945.
All
photos Department of the Army, unless otherwise noted. |
